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ABSTRACT

Federal habeas corpus law, which concerns the intersection of federal
criminal law and procedure, federal courts, and the division between federal and
state sovereignty, has been the subject of one of the most dramatic doctrinal
overhauls of the last thirty years from both legislative and judicial sources.
Since the 1970s, the federal courts, using a variety of doctrinal tools, have
created substantive and procedural restrictions on the ability of state prisoners to
challenge their convictions in federal court, and Congress codified many of those
restrictions and added a number of others with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism

The author is a trial attorney with the Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, of the U.S.
Department of Justice. A.B., University of Chicago, 2003; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2008. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not be taken to represent the views
of the Department of Justice. Thanks to Robert Weisberg, Jeffrey Fisher, and Lawrence Marshall
for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Essay.
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 1 Paradoxically, however,
those efforts to restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus relief have not
dramatically affected the number of habeas petitions filed in federal court, even
when controlling for the growth of the prison population. After examining a
number of empirical studies of habeas litigation in federal district courts, this
Essay suggests that the resilience of habeas corpus as a way of challenging a
state court conviction results largely from the use of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims as a safety valve to otherwise harsh substantive and procedural
barriers to habeas petitioners, even after the passage of AEDPA. This Essay
further suggests that the federal courts have, in recent years, begun to eliminate
the safety valve protections of ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, and
considers what impact this development may have on habeas corpus petitions in
the future.
II.

INTRODUCTION

The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, allows state prisoners
to challenge their detention on the grounds that their conviction or sentence is2
"in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
Habeas claims derive from criminal procedural rights and other constitutional
rights, rather than claims that are directly related to the jury's guilt or innocence
determination-which is why habeas corpus and state post-conviction review are
collectively known as collateral review. 3 Habeas is thus a form of constitutional
litigation, but one whose remedy---generally an order to retry the defendant or
change his sentence 4 -undoes the substantive outcome of criminal trials.

1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
3.
Innocence is not irrelevant to habeas claims, but it matters only indirectly. A prisoner
who wishes to proceed on procedurally defaulted claims can file a habeas petition on those claims if
he can demonstrate that in light of new evidence "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327
(1995); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (determining that the meaning of the
"more likely than not" standard used in Schlup "does not require absolute certainty about the
petitioner's guilt or innocence"). Even if the petitioner can meet this threshold test, however, he
must still demonstrate an independent constitutional violation in order to obtain habeas relief.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). The Supreme Court
has presumed, without deciding, that a prisoner who is sentenced to death and can demonstrate
actual innocence would present a violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, Fourteenth
Amendment rights, or both, on those facts alone, see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405-07, 417
(1993), but the Court has never had to issue a definitive holding on that question. See Barry
Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will
Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2251 (2010) (citing United
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)).
4.
See, e.g., Morales v. Coyle, 98 F. Supp. 2d 849, 904 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that the
petitioner's sentence shall be reduced to a life sentence or the respondent shall conduct a new
sentencing trial for petitioner).
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At least, that is how the habeas statute is supposed to work. In reality,
habeas corpus litigation now usually boils down to the question of whether or

not a petitioner's lawyer was so blundering or incompetent as to have failed to
serve as "counsel," as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 5 The majority of6

petitions now present at least one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
almost always as a way of indirectly presenting some other constitutional issue.7
A court faced with the question of whether a petitioner's lawyer was
constitutionally effective is supposed to answer two questions: first, has the
defense "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and, if the answer
to that first question is yes, then second, has "the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense" such that the result of the trial is unreliable. Those two
context-dependent questions yield results that are hard to generalize beyond the

facts of a specific case-a Problem that leads to results like those from the
Supreme Court's 2009 term. Facts matter quite a bit, and it is hard not to be
sympathetic to a federal district court charged with determining, on the basis of a
cold record and absent live testimony, whether a defense lawyer's performance
was sufficient.
Further, because the writ of habeas corpus involves a federal court reversing
a final conviction of a state court, habeas corpus litigation has always been
politically and legally controversial. The Supreme Court's 1953 opinion in
Brown v. Allen held that issues decided in state courts could be raised in federal
habeas corpus petitions. 10 Ever since this case was decided, academics and
judges have worried that such decisions would throw the courthouse doors open
to all manner of jailhouse lawyers seeking to raise all kinds of dubious legal

claims."

This process, in which criminal defendants would litigate a host of

5.
See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
6.
See infra Part IH.
7.
See, e.g., Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: ProceduralDefault, Habeas
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (1999)
(stating that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is often a precondition for raising
additional claims that petitioners otherwise would not be able to raise due to waiver or procedural
default).
8.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
9.
Compare Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that
counsel did not meet the representation requirements set forth in the Sixth Amendment when
counsel failed to introduce evidence of defendant's activities during the Korean War), with Bobby
v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009) (holding that counsel did meet the Sixth Amendment
representation requirements regardless of their alleged failure to secure an independent mentalhealth expert and to object to certain reports containing damaging evidence).
10. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953), superseded by statute, Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
11. Academic opinion on the issue often takes two forms. One view urges that habeas corpus
review be foreclosed, absent some failure in state corrective process or evidence that the petitioner
is actually innocent. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners,76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 459 (1963) (no review unless state corrective process is
inadequate); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,
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guilt-innocence issues in the state courts before raising constitutional issues in
the federal courts, would lead to criminal trials best described, to borrow a word
from Judge Posner, as "multiphasic."' 2 Phase one would be the state court trial,
which would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the state court
of appeals, which would review the jury's factual determinations and at least
some of the constitutional claims. 3

Phase two would be the state post-

conviction proceedings and the federal habeas corpus review, which would
review the constitutional claims arising from a petitioner's state court
proceedings.14 Depending upon exhaustion requirements, phase two could
conceivably involve several rounds of federal court proceedings.15
Since at least the late 1970s, proponents of broad federal review of state
court criminal convictions have rapidly lost ground. Proponents of finalitythose who push for very limited review or no review-have prevailed, at least as
a matter of doctrine. 16 Federal courts have imposed all sorts of restraints on

prisoners' ability to file habeas corpus petitions, for example, by making
compliance with state law procedural default rules a requirement for federal
jurisdiction. 17 However, the available evidence suggests that these efforts have
not addressed the actual number of petitions filed by state prisoners. The filing
rate of petitions jumped in the early 1960s-the period in which the Supreme
Court created the most lenient procedural requirements for habeas petitions-

38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970) (no review unless petitioner can provide evidence of actual
innocence). Another view encourages courts to continue reviewing constitutional claims in habeas
petitions, and often encourages federal courts to begin considering freestanding claims of
innocence. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993
SUP. CT.REV. 65, 108 (1993) (encouraging courts to use a "two-track" approach in which courts
would "grant habeas relief whenever a petitioner could show either (1) a constitutional
violation ... coupled with a reasonable probability of an unjust outcome ...or (2) an unreasonable
denial of a constitutional claim on the merits by the state courts"); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and
Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 310 (1994) (urging federal courts to begin considering
freestanding claims of innocence). Still, a third view argues that habeas jurisdiction is essentially
irrelevant in light of the small number of petitions filed and the even smaller number of successful
petitions. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction:The Limits of Models, 66 S.CAL. L.
REV. 2507, 2524-26 (1993). This view suggests that resources expended on habeas corpus
litigation could best be spent on other areas of criminal adjudication. See id. at 2526-27.
12. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. Id. Judge Posner also discusses Phase three, a phase involving § 1983 lawsuits
complaining of mistreatment or neglect by prison officials, and Phase four, a phase involving claims
against the prisoner's lawyers and judges complaining of violations of his civil rights. See id.
15. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14
(1995) (reporting many different types of habeas corpus petitions that are raised with some
frequency).
16. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that review is limited to
the record of the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits).
17. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497 (1986) (refusing to allow habeas review of
a procedurally defaulted discovery claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice).
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peaking at about 9,000 petitions a year in 1970.18 The filing rate leveled off in
the 1970s, then jumped again in the early 1980s, reaching about 11,000 filings in
1990.19 Prisoners were filing these petitions despite a decade of efforts to limit
their access to federal courts. Indeed, Congress's most recent effort to restrict
access to federal courts, AEDPA,2 ° which imposed a series of procedural hurdles
on habeas petitions and changed the standard under which courts reviewed
them,21 actually resulted in an increase in the number of petitions filed by state
prisoners, even
after adjusting for the growth in the prison population during
22
years.
those
While those efforts failed to reduce the number of habeas petitions filed in
federal courts, they did succeed in reshaping the nature of federal habeas corpus.
The procedural default rules and the deferential standards of review adopted by
federal judges and mandated by Congress in AEDPA conflated the state court
and federal court review of constitutional issues with only one real exception:
claims that a petitioner's counsel was constitutionally ineffective in the previous
state proceedings.3 The substance of post-conviction petitions has thus come to
revolve around the performance of a petitioner's trial counsel, claiming that at
some stage of the pre-trial, trial, or appeal process, counsel failed to make a
critical argument respecting a petitioner's rights and thus failed to meet the Sixth
Amendment's floor for adequate performance. 24

To see why this is so, consider some recent scenes from the Supreme
Court's habeas corpus decisions. On January 19, 2011, the Court issued a pair of
unanimous decisions in Harrington v. Richter25 and Premo v. Moore, two
federal habeas corpus cases from the Ninth Circuit, in which the petitioner had
successfully obtained the writ of habeas corpus by alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel. In Harrington,the longer of the two opinions, the Court took the

18.

VICTOR E. FLANGO, STATE JUSTICE INST., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS 9 (1994).
19. Id. at 10fig.L
20. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
21. § 107(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2006)).
22.

JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT

COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000 NCJ 189430, at 7 (2002) (estimating that AEDPA resulted
in one additional habeas corpus filing per month for every 3,400 state prison inmates).
23. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (reviewing petitioner's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel).
24. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)) (holding that petitioner's counsel was deficient for failing to
investigate and present mitigating evidence at trial).
25. 131 S. Ct. 770(2011).
26. 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
27. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 783; Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 738-39 (citing Moore v. Czerniak,
574 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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time to address-in "unusually strong language"8-the Ninth Circuit's approach
to issuing the writ. 29 The Court stated:
The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of
those held in violation of the law. Judges must be vigilant and
independent in reviewing petitions for the writ, a commitment that
entails substantial judicial resources. Those resources are diminished
and misspent, however, and confidence in the writ and the law it
vindicates undermined, if there is judicial disregard for the sound and
established principles that inform its proper issuance.3 °
In Premo, the Court's message to the lower courts was less direct, but
perhaps more consequential. The theme was not the danger of judicial disregard
of legal principles, but instead the high degree of deference-phrased variously
as "substantial deference," "latitude," and a court's "limited role" in searching
only for "manifest deficiency" in the performance of counsel3 --due to the
decisions of trial counsel when evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 32 Counsel must be given the freedom to make strategic decisions, the
Court reasoned, lest "ineffective-assistance claims that lack [the] necessary
foundation..,
bring instability to the very process the inquiry seeks to
'33
protect.

The Supreme Court is not always so resistant to habeas corpus petitions,
however, as the Court's previous term reveals. In Porter v. McCollum,34 the
petitioner prevailed. The Court found that Porter's counsel had not offered the
sort of representation required by the Sixth Amendment because he had not
investigated the possibility that Porter, a Korean War veteran, suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder.35 The jury might have been swayed by that
36
evidence if it had been offered, and may have reached a different sentence.

28. John Elwood, The Supreme Court Today: Strong Words on Habeas, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 19, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/O1/19/the-supreme-court-todaystrong-words-on-habeas.
29. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 780.
30. Id.
31. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741-42 (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
32. Id. (citing Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
33. Id. at 741.
34. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 453. The Court explained:
Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their
service, especially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter did. Moreover, the
relevance of Porter's extensive combat experience is not only that he served honorably
under extreme hardship and gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find
mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on Porter.
Id. at 455 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 448.
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Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and threw out Porter's
Accordingly, the
37
sentence.
death
While the Supreme Court is not always so resistant, it is not exactly
welcoming either. In another case, Wood v. Allen, 38 the petitioner lost in a 7-2
decision. The Court found that Wood's counsel had not been constitutionally
ineffective for not investigating or presenting evidence that he was mentally
retarded and thus, under Supreme Court precedent, 39 was not eligible for the
death penalty. 4° Wood's counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue further
mental evaluations after reading through an initial evaluation prepared by an

expert witness and finding nothing promising. 41 Because counsel, working
under the pressures of a capital trial and sentencing proceeding, had decided to
devote their time to pursuing other arguments, the Supreme Court would not
42
second guess counsel's efforts by finding counsel constitutionally deficient.
43
Accordingly, the Supreme Court refused to throw out Wood's death sentence.

Those were not the only cases from the 2009 term in which the Supreme
Court dealt with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel. Very early on in the term, the Court issued a per curiam opinion
reversing the Sixth Circuit's holding that a petitioner's counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for not meeting the American Bar Association's
(ABA) standards for capital defense counsel." The Court had reversed a pair of
death sentences between 2000 and 2005 because a habeas petitioner's lawyer
failed to adhere to the ABA's standards; the Sixth Circuit's error, however, was
in tossing out the death sentence due to the defense counsel's failure to meet an
ABA standard that was not in effect at the time of the trial.45

37. Id. at 456. The Court denied Porter's petition for certiorari insofar as his petition
challenged his conviction for murder. 1d. at 448 n. 1.
38. 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
39. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded).
40. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 844, 851.
41. Id. at 850-51. The case had initially presented a more interesting question, whether a
state court's earlier finding that Wood's counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue further
mental evaluations was a factual finding that needed to be reasonable in light of the evidence
presented, or whether it was a factual determination that would stand unless Wood could rebut it
with clear and convincing evidence and whether there is a difference those two standards. See id. at
848. The Court declined to address that issue because it found that even under Wood's proposed
reading of the habeas statute the state court had not committed an error warranting habeas relief. See
id. at 849.
42. See id. at 851.
43. See id.
44. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 15, 17 (2009).
45. Id. at 16-17, 19 (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 10.7, Comment, at 81, 83 (rev. ed. 2003); 1 ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-4.1, at 4-53, 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)) (contrasting the ABA
standards in effect in 1985 with those in effect as of 2003 and finding the latter to be much more
expansive). The Court's discussion of the objective standards that a federal court should use to
judge the performance of a defense lawyer attracted less press attention than Justice Alito's
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Building off of these and other cases, this Essay argues that the last twentyfive years of habeas corpus litigation, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Strickland v. Washington, and especially the fifteen years since the passage of
AEDPA, should be regarded as the ineffective assistance of counsel era in
federal habeas litigation. This resulted from the combination of three factors:
(1) the malleability of ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, which can
sweep in any other kind of substantive claim, (2) the timing of ineffective
assistance claims, which, because they almost always require additional fact
finding, can be presented for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding, and,
perhaps the most important factor, (3) the legal profession's unique regard for
the role of defense attorneys and the importance of corrective process, which
caused reformers to impose all sorts of procedural and doctrinal burdens on
petitioners but leave open the possibility for relief if a prisoner's defense counsel
had been deficient. Ineffective assistance of counsel became the safety valve
built into various efforts to reduce the number and frequency of habeas petitions
or to otherwise reform the process.
This Essay also suggests that the ineffective assistance of counsel era is now
coming to an end. While the Supreme Court may grant the occasional petition
from an inmate like George Porter, Jr., the yetitioner in Porter v. McCollum,
those cases will be the very rare exception. Habeas litigants never enjoyed
particularly favorable odds in federal court, but within the last five years, the
Supreme Court has used a number of doctrinal tools, some derived from AEDPA
and others from the Court's own jurisprudence, to close the safety valve.
However, as with most habeas reforms, narrowing the remedy for ineffective
assistance of counsel probably will not do much to reduce the number of habeas
petitions, We can still expect prisoners to file as many petitions as before, but
with the ultimate chance of success now further reduced.
Part III of this Essay presents the empirical support for the premise that
ineffective assistance of counsel has swamped all the other available claims in
federal habeas corpus litigation and discusses the doctrinal changes in federal
habeas litigation that brought about the change. Part IV offers a few
explanations as to why courts and legislators would make it increasingly more
difficult to obtain habeas relief on other sorts of claims while leaving ineffective
assistance of counsel as a relatively broad and inviting avenue for relief. Part V
examines the various ways in which the Supreme Court has recently narrowed

concurrence, which suggested that the lower courts should not pay special attention to the ABA
standards at all. See id. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito stated:
It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work that a defense
attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations imposed by the
Constitution, and I see no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged
position in making that determination.
Id.
46. For a contemporaneous effort to parse the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence
from the 2009 term, see Linda Greenhouse, Selective Empathy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2009, 9:11
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/selective-empathy/.
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the ineffective assistance of counsel exception, while discussing two cases that
might demonstrate the opposite point, Padilla v. Kentucky, an ineffective
assistance of counsel case involving the collateral consequences of criminal plea
bargains,47 and Martinez v. Ryan, a case for which certiorari was granted for the
October 2011 term, involving the right to effective assistance of counsel in the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims also presented in a state
collateral review process. 48 Parts IV and V are thus the real doctrinal meat of
this Essay, although hopefully part of the point is that in habeas corpus litigation,
even more so than in other kinds of constitutional litigation, doctrine seems to be
determined more by the psychology of the profession and political and social
pressures than by analytical precision or a priori commitments.
III. THE PREVALENCE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS IN
HABEAS CORPUS LITIGATION

Habeas litigants make ineffective assistance of counsel claims more
frequently than any other type of claim.49 Indeed, habeas litigants make
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments so frequently that those claims have
largely eclipsed any other assertion of a deprivation of constitutional rights.50
This was not always the case. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims have
begun to dominate habeas corpus litigation only within the last thirty years, a
development that has resulted from changes to criminal procedure doctrine itself,
as well as changes to the criminal justice system as a whole.5'
A.

The StatisticalPrevalence of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Empirical studies of federal habeas corpus have been few and far between,
but those studies that have been done point to a clear trend: the number of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims has grown steadily, and as such claims
have become more and more prevalent, claims about other constitutional
deprivations have fallen by the wayside in federal habeas corpus litigation. 52 In
a study examining petitions filed in federal court between the years 1973 to
1975, the most popular claim, made by litigants in 40% of cases, was that of a
"due process" violation, a catch all category that might include any manner of

47. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
48. Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Martinez
v. Ryan, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (2011).
49. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 114 (2008).
50. Ellen Kreitzberg & Linda Carter, Innocent of a Capital Crime: Parallels Between
Innocence of a Crime and Innocence of the Death Penalty, 42 TULSA L. REV. 437, 449 n.73 (2006).
51. See Voigts, supra note 7, at 1110-13.
52. See FLANGO, supra note 18, at 10 fig.1 (showing the increasing trend in the filings of
habeas petitions); HANSON & DALEY, supra note 15, at 14 (showing ineffective assistance of
counsel issues as the subject of a large majority of habeas corpus petitions).
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evidentiary, trial, or pre-sentencing ruling.53 The study demonstrated that habeas
litigants alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in only 16% of cases at this
time.54 Sentencing violations formed the basis of the petition in 14% of cases,
and speedy trial claims in 13% of habeas cases in the study. 55
The same researchers then examined federal habeas petitions filed between
1979 and 1981.56 In the meantime, the Supreme Court had issued its opinion in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 57 a decision that created the procedural default doctrine for
habeas litigants.58 That doctrine requires, in short, that if litigants make a claim
in federal court that they failed to raise either on direct appeal in state court or, if
such proceedings are available in a state post-conviction proceeding, then they
would have to demonstrate "cause" for the default and "prejudice" from the
resulting failure of the state court to consider the claim. 59 Cause and prejudice
supplanted the more permissive "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia,60 a
standard that allowed habeas litigants to raise new claims in a petition so long as
the state could not show that the petitioner had sandbagged by holding off on
making the claim in state court for strategic reasons. 61 Because some claims
lend themselves more readily to a cause and prejudice analysis than others-for
instance, a due process claim barred by state law or a claim that the prosecution
suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of the rule in Brady v. Maryland,62
and withheld it for years-some claims were bound to become more prevalent in
the era of cause and prejudice than they had been before. Commentators

53. Richard Faust, Tina J. Rubenstein & Larry W. Yackle, The Great Writ in Action:
EmpiricalLight on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637,
680 tbl.2 (1991). While this survey was one of the more intensive empirical studies conducted of
habeas corpus petitions, one should hesitate before comparing it too readily to other studies since
the researchers examined petitions in only one jurisdiction, the Southern District of New York. Id.
at 668.
54. Id. at 680 tbl.2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 677-80 tbl.2.
57. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
58. See id. at 87.
59. Id. at 86-87 (footnote omitted) (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)).
60. See id. at 87-90 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Wainright, 433
U.S. at 72).
61. Fay, 372 U.S. at 439. The Court stated:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the
federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his
federal claims on the merits-though of course only after the federal court has satisfied
itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the
applicant's default.
Id.
62. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
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predicted that habeas petitioners would make ineffective assistance of counsel
claims more often under the cause and prejudice standard because collateral
review was the natural time to raise such claims, and because any number of
claims could form the basis of an
other waived or defaulted constitutional
63
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
To some extent, the later empirical study of habeas corpus petitions bore out
these predictions. Due process claims were still the most frequent and federal
petitioners raised them in 49% of all cases. 64 The number of petitioners alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel jumped markedly from 16% in the first survey
to 29% in the second survey. 65 Next in popularity were claims alleging a search
and seizure violation, 17% of petitions, sentencing violations,6614% of petitions,
and challenges to the validity of guilty pleas, 13% of petitions.
The next broad empirical survey of habeas petitions was conducted in 1995
by the National Center for State Courts. 67 The intervening years had built on the
procedural limitations that the Court started with Wainwright v. Sykes. 6 8 The
Supreme Court had already issued a decision barring federal habeas litigants
from raising search and seizure claims in post-conviction petitions, 69 as well as
barring litigants from receiving the benefit of "new rules" issued after their direct70
appeals had been exhausted or their time for filing an appeal had run out.
Meanwhile, the Court proceeded to widen the doctrine of procedural default,
going so far as to hold in the early 1980s that the doctrine would extend to
claims not raised in state court that bore on the factual innocence of the
petitioner. 71 Moreover, the Court began to acknowledge that it would not
construe an attorney's failure to recognize the factual basis of a claim as
sufficient to satisfy the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test, nor would it
consider an attorney's simple failure to make a claim, despite seeing the factual

63. See Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 473, 509 n.187 (1978) ("If trial counsel has inexcusably failed to raise a viable
claim, the habeas applicant can always assert a denial of the constitutional right of effective
assistance of counsel."); James A. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses,
New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 478 (1977) ("[I]t appears that if the defendant shows
ineffective assistance of counsel which would otherwise result in a forfeiture of a federal claim, the
ineffectiveness will normally qualify as cause under Sykes, allowing the federal habeas corpus court
to reach the merits of the underlying federal claim.").
64. Faust, Rubinstein & Yackle, supra note 53, at 680 tbl.2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 15. This survey examined habeas petitions in eighteen
federal judicial districts, located in nine different states; together, the districts accounted for about
half of all habeas petitions filed in the United States. Id. at iv-v.
68. For an overview of changes to habeas corpus during this time, see Robert Weisberg, A
Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990).
69. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469, 481-82 (1976).

70. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1989).
71. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982) (refusing to limit the doctrine to cases
where the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding function of the trial).
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basis for it, as constituting cause and prejudice. 72 The Court closed another
loophole in the procedural default doctrine by requiring that habeas petitioners
exhaust state remedies for all claims presented in a habeas corpus petition,73 and
prevented them from using subsequent petitions to raise new claims, or at least
made clear that claims made in a subsequent petition would be subject to the
cause and prejudice test.74 Further, the Court held that federal district courts
could evaluate all claims in a habeas petition under a harmless error standardeven those claims that, on direct appeal, a court evaluates under a "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Once again, changes in the doctrine underlying federal habeas corpus
litigation had effects on the substance of the claims made by habeas corpus
petitioners. The summary tabulation of petition characteristics in the 1995 study
revealed some of the ways habeas litigants responded to the new doctrinal
barriers. In 25% of habeas corpus petitions, litigants alleged some form of
ineffective assistance of counsel, making it by far the most frequent claim in
76
Trial court errors, such as
federal habeas corpus litigation at that time.
erroneous evidentiary rulings, were the next most frequent claim, although they
Claims of Fourteenth
comprised only 15% of the prisoners' petitions.
Amendment and Fifth Amendment violations-encompassing due process
violations suffered by state and federal prisoners and self-incrimination
violations-were made in 14% and 12% of petitions, respectively. 78 Petitioners
raised Sixth Amendment claims, aside from ineffective assistance, Eighth
Amendment claims, and prosecutorial misconduct claims in less than 10% of
Meanwhile, Stone v. Powell had its intended
petitions in the survey.
effect 8 0--petitioners made Fourth Amendment claims in only about 5% of the
petitions in the study. 81 The remaining Fourth Amendment petitions are
puzzling, although it is possible that the lag was due to the lack of a "full and
fair" opportunity to litigate certain Fourth Amendment claims prior to or just
82 or that the claims may have been Kimmelman claims,
after
v. Powell,
petitioners
convert
a Fourth Amendment violation into a Sixth
whereStone

72. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1986) ("[T]he mere fact that counsel failed
to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it,
does not constitute cause for a procedural default.").
73. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
74. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489,493 (1991).
75. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1993) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
76. See HANSON & DALEY, supra note 15, at 14.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Sixth Amendment claims, other than ineffective assistance petitions, comprised 7%
of the petitions, Eighth Amendment claims comprised 7% of the petitions, and prosecutorial
misconduct claims comprised 6% of the petitions. Id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 69.
81. HANSON & DALEY, supranote 15, at 14.
82. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
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Amendment violation by alleging that trial counsel was
83 ineffective for failing to
move for the suppression of illegally seized evidence.
Shortly after the 1995 survey was released, Congress passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,s 4 which once more
changed the landscape of federal habeas corpus. 85 Much more could be said
about the alterations that AEDPA made to the criminal justice system, but
among other changes, the statute had the effect of enshrining the procedural
default doctrine through a provision requiring habeas litigants to exhaust state
remedies before filing a petition in federal court. 86 AEDPA also changed the
standard of review for purely legal claims, requiring that federal judges defer to
the legal conclusions of state court judges unless those determinations "resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States," 87 or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented." 88 AEDPA thus requires habeas petitioners to
first submit the claim in their petitions to a state court, either on direct appeal or
through a state post-conviction proceeding, before submitting a petition to a
federal district court. 89 The federal district court may then review whether the
state court's decision was contrary to federal law, an unreasonable application of
an otherwise correct interpretation of the law, or a correct application of the law
based on an unreasonable interpretation of the underlying facts. 90 The big
change, in other words, is that federal district courts may no longer engage in de
novo review of constitutional claims in habeas petitions; they must instead look
for something like plain error-a standard akin to that used on direct appeal,
rather than one used in a truly collateral proceeding. 91 If the petitioner's
constitutional claim rests on a mixed question of law and fact, such as a finding
that hearsay testimony introduced against a defendant was a co-conspirator's

83. Kimmelman claims take their name from Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986),
which established that counsel's failure to make a suppression motion for obviously inadmissible
evidence may constitute constitutionally inadequate assistance. Id. at 375.
84. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as 28 U.S.C.§ 2254).
85. See generally Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologiesof the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing the legislative history of AEDPA).
86. AEDPA § 104(1) (as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006)). However, this
provision does not prevent a judge from denying a petition on the merits, even if the petitioner has
failed to exhaust state court remedies. See id. (as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2006)).
Petitioners who fail to file a direct appeal of their conviction may have their claims dismissed by the
district court for failing to exhaust state remedies, even if the petitioner filed a post-conviction
petition. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999).
87. AEDPA § 104(3) (as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
88. AEDPA § 104(3) (as codified in § 2254(d)(2)).
89. AEDPA § 104(1) (as codified in § 2254(b)(1)).
90. AEDPA § 104(3) (as codified in § 2254(d)(1)-(2)).
91.

RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE 29-30 (5th ed. 2005) (citing § 2254(d)).
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declaration, then federal courts apply a similarly deferential standard. 92 The
district court will use the state court's finding on this question unless there is no
finding, the finding is unreasonable, or the state court made the finding while
applying an improper legal standard. 93 If the petitioner failed to develop the
facts underlying a claim in state court, the petitioner cannot obtain an evidentiary
hearing absent a showing that "the claim relies on either a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable," or relies on "a factual predicate that
could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence." 94 Additionally, the petitioner must show that "the facts underlying
the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 95 This last provision requires a
showing that the factual predicates of a properly preserved claim demonstrate the
innocence of the petitioner even before the district court holds an evidentiary
hearing.
Surely, a change in the procedure for habeas corpus petitions, coupled with a
substantive change in the standard of review applied to those petitions, would
result in some pronounced changes to substantive habeas corpus claims. That is
precisely what happened. The National Center for State Courts conducted the
most recent empirical study of federal habeas corpus claims in 2007, the first
study of its kind since AEDPA was passed. 96 Confirming the trend of the last
thirty years, the researchers found that ineffective assistance of counsel was far
and away the most frequently raised claim in federal habeas corpus litigation.
Litigants asserted ineffective assistance in 81% of all habeas petitions in capital
cases, raising it in thirty of thirty-three successful petitions, and in 50% of all
habeas petitions in noncapital cases, raising it in only two of seven successful
petitions.97 Petitioners challenged evidentiary rulings, including Kimmelman
claims of ineffective assistance, in 46% of all capital petitions and 20% of all
noncapital petitions. 98 Petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the conviction or offered new evidence of innocence in 26% of all
capital cases, and in ten of thirty-three successful petitions, and in9919% of
noncapital habeas petitions, including two of seven successful petitions.
In contrast to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, litigants
challenged the conduct of prosecutors more frequently than before the passage of

92. Id. at 30-31.
93. Id.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A).
95. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
96. NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TEcHNIcAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
l/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id.at 29.
99. Id. at 28-30.
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AEDPA, but not nearly as often as they challenged the conduct of defense
attorneys. Forty-eight percent of habeas petitions in capital cases and 10% of
habeas petitions in noncapital cases challenged improper prosecutor
comments. 1° ° Forty-three percent of capital cases and 13% of noncapital cases
10
also raised a Brady claim about lost or undisclosed evidence. ' Finally,
petitioners challenged guilty pleas more frequently in noncapital petitions (15%)
than in capital petitions (4%), a result that is probably attributable to the fact that
the vast majority of capital sentences occur after jury trials and not after guilty
pleas. 102

The three surveys discussed all used slightly different methodologies, and
only the final survey from 2007 looked at all judicial districts, rather than a
single district or a representative sample of districts. 0 3 It is difficult to make
generalizations on the basis of the data presented in the three studies, especially
since the surveys were separated by a number of years and there are not
sufficient data to provide complete trend lines. But, the available evidence
justifies the conclusion that over the last thirty years, ineffective assistance of
counsel has become the dominant claim in federal habeas corpus litigation.
B.

The Many Types of Ineffective Assistance

It is impossible to discuss the frequency of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims without also discussing the many forms that such a claim can take.
Indeed, over the years, ineffective assistance of counsel has not only come to
dominate in terms of numbers, but it has come to dominate habeas corpus
doctrine as well-turning into a legal claim spanning nearly all aspects of the
trial and appellate processes, and some limited aspects of the state postconviction process, while also sweeping in other conceivable legal claims.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is, in short, not just a popular claim in federal
habeas corpus, but a truly vertiginous one as well. There are as many ways to be
system. 104
ineffective as there are lawyers and defendants in the criminal justice
While the right to an effective advocate at trial is likely the right that most
immediately springs to mind when one imagines the Sixth Amendment right to
05
a proceeding.'
counsel, the right to counsel now extends to all critical stages of
Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel begins, at least
theoretically, sometime before jury selection and continues through the

100. Id. at 30.
101. Id. Originally, petitioners made Brady claims in cases where the prosecutor had
suppressed exculpatory evidence, but the doctrine has now been expanded to include police and
other members of the prosecution and law enforcement teams. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
438 (1995).
102. KING ET AL., supra note 96, at 30.
103. See supra notes 53, 67, 96 and accompanying text.
104. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 91, collects a number of examples of successful habeas
petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
105. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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exhaustion of direct appeals. 10 6 The drunken appointed counsel who cannot
show up to the courthouse sober or stay awake through the trial is the
stereotypical ineffective counsel. 1°7 But in the case law, ineffective assistance is
evergreen. Before trial, it can take many forms. It can be established by an
attorney's forfeit of legal claims, such as counsel's failure at voir dire to
challenge for cause a juror who offered statements of partiality10t
Or it can
consist of counsel's failure to move for the dismissal of an untimely indictment
on state law grounds. 109 It can also consist of an attorney's investigative failures.
For example, counsel's inability or unwillingness to conduct a basic pretrial
investigation, whether that involves interviewing eyewitnesses or exploring alibi
testimony, may constitute ineffective assistance.7 ° Needless to say, defense
counsel that fails to notify the court of plans to present an alibi defense also
offers ineffective assistance."'
At trial, defense counsel can be ineffective for committing to a poor defense
11 3
strategy, 112 or for failing to investigate and present an alternate defense.

106. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (recognizing the right to effective
assistance of counsel on appeal); Mitchell v. Mason, 325 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
petitioner was effectively denied counsel when his lawyer spent a total of six minutes meeting with
him prior to jury selection and the start of trial); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)
(concluding that standby counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to conduct an
independent investigation into petitioner's competency to stand trial prior to pretrial competency
hearing).
107. See, e.g., Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 378 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citing court
appointed counsel for contempt for being intoxicated during the trial), aff'd sub nom., Ex parte
Haney, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992).
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that trial
counsel's failure to challenge a juror for cause after the juror made a statement that she thought she
could be fair, but immediately qualified the statement with a statement of partiality, was
"objectively unreasonable").
109. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629-30 (5th Cir. 2004).
110. See Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 473-74 (5th Cir.) (holding that failure of a capital
murder defendant's counsel to interview surviving victim who had given exculpatory statements
constituted ineffective assistance), amended on reh'g in part,391 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2004); Riley v.
Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1325 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that failure to interview or call a key witness
who would have corroborated defendant's testimony as it related to a affirmative defense
constituted ineffective assistance); Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the failure to investigate and interview a crucial eyewitness constituted ineffective assistance);
Holmes v. McKune, 59 F. App'x 239, 254 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the failure to
interview or call an alibi witness constituted ineffective assistance).
111. See, e.g., Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)) (holding that because counsel failed to file notice of alibi
defense until three days before trial, despite the fact that a defense investigator uncovered at least
three alibi witnesses beforehand, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel).
112. See White v. Godinez, 301 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel was
ineffective because he committed to a losing strategy without adequately consulting client); Rios v.
Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that client received ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel failed to reasonably investigate client's case prior to selecting a defense
strategy).
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Counsel can be ineffective for failing to move for the suppression of key
evidence, a Kimmelman claim,114 or for failing to investigate a key piece of

evidence. 115 Counsel may be considered ineffective in the presentation of the
defendant's case, for example, by presenting a witness who opens the door to
questioning about a defendant's previous convictions, 1t6 or by presenting a
weak, poorly investigated alibi defense. 1 Then, of course, there are instances
where defense counsel is simply per se ineffective, usually because counsel has
done something so egregiously incompetent that it casts the whole trial into
case. 118
doubt; for example, sleeping during the presentation of the State's
Likewise, at the penalty phase, ineffective counsel might reject a favorable plea
deal because of a misunderstanding of the applicable sentencing law or make
an unfavorable plea for the same reason. 12 If the defendant's guilt was

determined after a jury trial, ineffective counsel at the penalty stage could consist
of counsel's failure to investigate mitigating factors in the sentencing
determination. 121 Finally, counsel may simply proclaim in summation at122the
penalty phase that the defendant is "a worthless man.... [I]hate my client."'
The list of possible errors by counsel extends to the appeal stage, where a

finding of ineffectiveness can stem from a failure to appeal errors in the trial
phase, 123 the sentencing phase, 124 or the appeal itself. 125 And this leaves out the

113. Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel was
constitutionally inefficient due to a failure to investigate and present a defense based on the client's
mental health history).
114. See Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986)).
115. Maxwell v. Mahoney, 198 F.3d 254, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
116. Miller v. Anderson, 255 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 268 F.3d 485
(7th Cir. 2001).
117. Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1997).
118. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir. 1996).
119. See Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).
120. See, e.g., Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 580-81 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel's
failure to realize that pleading guilty to obtain a juvenile sentence permitted the government to
appeal and seek a harsher sentence was incompetent representation).
121. See Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 421 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
122. Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462-63 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Given [counsel's] failure to
present mitigating evidence and his unfortunate comments, clearly there is a 'reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."' (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))).
123. See Richey v. Mitchell, 395 F.3d 660, 682 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant's
appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise ineffectiveness based on the trial
counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the state's evidence).
124. See Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 192-93 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant's
appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise a meritorious claim of instructional
error).

125. See Harris v. Day, 226 F.3d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant's appellate
counsel was ineffective because he wrote an Anders brief that failed to identify the issues raised in
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cases where ineffectiveness is presumed because of a conflict of interest between
the counsel and another participant in the trial, usually a defendant.126
By now the picture is clear-ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine gives
state prisoners an impressively large number of possible errors to raise in their
federal habeas corpus petitions and courts can grant relief for an error at almost
any stage of the trial process.
Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine also stretches to include other
areas of criminal procedure doctrine so that a possibly meritorious claim, if not
presented at all or presented poorly by defense counsel, may then become the
basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court's
decision in Kimmelman v. Morrison127 illustrates how this process of
envelopment works. After the respondent in Kimmelman was convicted of rape,
he filed a federal habeas corpus petition arguing that his counsel was ineffective
for his failure to file a suppression motion against a damning piece of evidence
opinion spent
that the police had seized from
,129
• • his home. 128 The Supreme Court's
The
almost no time evaluating the competence of the respondent's attorney.
central issue in the case was, instead, whether the respondent was truly
prejudiced by his attorney's failure to file a motion to suppress. 3 ' If the
respondent had brought this claim as a straightforward Fourth Amendment
claim, the Court would have dismissed the case pursuant to Stone v. Powell.'3
And, in fact, the case almost surely would not have reached the Supreme Court
or received more than a perfunctory review by the federal court of appeals in that

the appeal); Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant's appellate
counsel was ineffective because he failed to request plain error review of an issue raised on appeal).
126. See, e.g., Harris v. Carter, 337 F.3d 758, 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
defendant's counsel was presumably ineffective because counsel previously represented a witness
for the prosecution); Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748, 752 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant's
counsel was presumably ineffective because counsel simultaneously represented a codefendant and
solicited testimony from each defendant against the other).
127. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
128. Id. at 368-69, 371. The evidence was a bed sheet that the state's experts testified
contained stains and hair sample evidence linking Morrison to the victim in the case. Id. at 370.
Morrison's attorney objected to the introduction of the sheet at trial, but failed to comply with a
New Jersey court rule requiring attorneys to make all suppression motions within thirty days of the
indictment. Id. at 368-69. Morrison's attorney did not comply with the procedural rule because he
was unaware that the police had seized the sheet; he was apparently unaware of the seizure of the
bed sheet because he had not conducted any pretrial discovery. Id.
129. See id. at 383-87 (discussing attorney competence in Part HI-A of the Kimmelman
majority opinion-spanning a total of four pages).
130. See id. at 387-91. Counsel's failure to conduct pretrial discovery in Kimmelman resulted
from the decision to investigate the credibility of witnesses, rather than to look into the possibility
that the state would use scientific evidence at trial. Id. at 385-86. The Court simply held that the
defense attorney could not defend this decision because "such a complete lack of pretrial
preparation puts at risk both the defendant's fight to an 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the
prosecution' and the reliability of the adversarial testing process." Id. at 385 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)).
131. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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situation. The state of New Jersey picked up on this disparity and urged the
Court to lift the Sixth Amendment veil from the respondent's claim, and to
dismiss it as a Fourth Amendment claim that was inappropriate for collateral
review. 132
The majority of the Court, however, took the view that, regardless of the
underlying claim, the respondent was making a Sixth Amendment claim and his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel included counsel's failure to litigate claims
that would have otherwise been barred on collateral review.133 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, conceded that the bed sheet seized from the
respondent's apartment was pretty reliable evidence of his guilt, but held that
such considerations about the reliability of the evidence were irrelevant to the
concerns about the integrity of the adversarial process that underlie the right to
counsel. 34 The majority was divided over this question. Justice Powell wrote

separately in order to emphasize his belief that the case did not settle "[t]he more
difficult question [of] whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable
evidence can ever constitute 'prejudice. ' 9135 However, Justice Brennan's

emphasis on the adversarial process in the majority opinion suggests that it can,
although the "prejudice" at issue in Kimmelman-type cases is a strange sort of
prejudice.' 36 A defense attorney's failure to move to suppress probative,
incriminating evidence is not prejudicial in that such a failure in and of itself
throws the result of the trial into doubt. Rather, the defense attorney's failure to
make a suppression motion is prejudicial to the defendant because an
embarrassingly obvious blunder like the failure to make a basic pretrial motion,

or the failure to undertake discovery, taints every other decision made by that
attorney. It demonstrates a real risk that the adversarial process had broken
down and that any corrective process growing out of that trial could not be
trusted to have identified other constitutional deficiencies with the defendant's

conviction.
Other cases highlight the same idea, that allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel raise concerns about the adversarial process in the courts below, and

132. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 374-75.
133. See id. at 378-79. Justice Brennan offered two arguments for this holding in the majority
opinion. First, because ineffective assistance claims are generally reserved for collateral review,
barring claims like Morrison's on the basis of Stone v. Powell would deprive criminal defendants of
a chance to vindicate their right to counsel. Id. at 377-78. Second, Stone rested on a determination
that the state should not have to bear the burden of exclusion when the time of the exclusionary
remedy was so greatly removed from the illegal conduct of the police, and the deterrent value of
exclusion was minimal. Id. at 379. The Court could not make such a determination with respect to
ineffective assistance of counsel, however, and the state should bear the burden of any breakdowns
in the adversarial process. Id. Note, however, that both arguments assume that the right to counsel
encompasses the right to have counsel make any applicable pretrial suppression motions, and that
the failure to do so makes the subsequent conviction an illegitimate "cost" borne by the defendant.
134. Id. at 379-80 (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984)).
135. Id. at 391 (Powell, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 379 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 490).
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so the normal presumptions about finality and the reliability of corrective
processes no longer apply. Consider what the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Davis v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections.137 In Davis,
defense counsel failed to preserve the petitioner's Batson challenge by renewing
his objection before the start of trial. 138 When Davis raised the Batson issue on
appeal, the appellate court noted that the objection was "well taken," but
declined to address it because the issue had not been properly preserved for
appeal. 139 Davis then filed a state post-conviction petition raising, among other
140
issues, his counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to preserve the Batson issue.
After the state court rejected Davis's post-conviction petition, Davis filed 141a
federal habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
While the district court rejected Davis's petition, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated that decision and remanded the case.142 The appellate panel
held, likely because Davis's attorney had raised a contemporaneous objection to
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, that there was no indication of a
strategic reason for counsel to drop the Batson issue before the jury was sworn
in.143 The court concluded that there was "a reasonable probability that the
Florida Third District Court of Appeal would have reversed Davis's conviction
had trial counsel preserved a Batson challenge." 144 Consequently, Davis was
entitled to relief, even though the federal court of appeals could go no further
than to say that relief was possible had the issue been properly preserved. 145
Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine thus swept in part of the doctrine
behind Batson claims, in that Davis had to show he had a meritorious claim, but
he did not need to show that his claim was certain to prevail on appeal. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to apply a lower standard to Davis's
Batson claim as filtered through ineffectiveness doctrine than it would have
applied if the issue was preserved and raised directly.
Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine has swept in doctrines beyond
Batson claims. In Washington v. Hofbauer,146 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

granted relief to a petitioner whose attorney failed to object to prosecutorial

137. 341 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 1312 (citing Davis v. State, 710 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per
curiam)). A Batson challenge, named for the Supreme Court's decision on the issue in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), allows a defendant to challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See id. at 89. Under Florida law, defense counsel
must renew a Batson challenge before the jury is sworn in to preserve the issue for appeal. See
Davis, 341 F.3d at 1312 n.3 (citing Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1993)).
139. Id. (quoting Davis, 710 So. 2d at 724) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1313, 1317.
143. Id. at 1314 n.7.
144. Id. at 1317.
145. See id.
146. 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2000).
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misconduct. 14 7 In Flores v. Demskie,148 the Second Circuit granted relief to a
to comply
petitioner whose counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor's failure
149
with a statute requiring disclosure of witnesses' prior statements.
The rise of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not merely a question
of numbers, but also a question of doctrine. Habeas petitioners are not only
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel more frequently than they raise
any other claim, courts are also finding ineffective assistance of counsel
throughout the criminal adjudication process and are using the doctrine to
address constitutional violations that may not otherwise entitle a petitioner to
relief. Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine thus reaches almost any error
that the defense attorney can make, plus almost any error that the judge or
prosecutor can make, if unaddressed.
There are two possible ways of understanding this area of legal doctrine.
The first is to suggest that prisoners are merely latching onto ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in order to get around procedural default rules. In
order to have a claim to raise in a habeas petition, prisoners blame their
conviction on their counsel. It is of course partly true that prisoners can always
allege some kind of ineffectiveness by their trial counsel. 50 The rise of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims suggests, however, that another dynamic
is also at work. Habeas corpus rests on the premise that claims presented in
habeas litigation have already been addressed by state or federal corrective
processes.' 1 Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine should capture those rare
cases in which attorney performance was so bad that it deprived the defendant of
an adequate corrective process in the courts below. This system would work,
then, if the legal system generally did afford corrective process to defendants and
the decisions below were adequate to allay any concerns that the defendant's
constitutional rights had been violated. It would not work, however, if the
corrective process afforded to criminal defendants in state courts was not as

147. Id. at 694.
148. 215 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
149. Id. at 295.
150. This was the reason courts traditionally opposed creating a remedy for ineffective
assistance of counsel. For example, in 1945, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion
written by Thurman Arnold, who was not exactly a conservative in his day, categorically rejected
any habeas corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel for precisely this reason. See Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The Court explained:
The opportunity to try his former lawyer has its undoubted attraction to a disappointed
prisoner. In many cases there is no written transcript and so he has a clear field for the
exercise of his imagination. He may realize that his allegations will not be believed but
the relief from monotony offered by a hearing in court is well worth the trouble of writing
them down. To allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under
a liberal definition of that phrase is to give every convict the privilege of opening a
Pandora's box of accusations which trial courts near large penal institutions would be
compelled to hear.
Id.
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2006).
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thorough or reliable as reformers suggested it was. The trouble with habeas
corpus in the era of cause and prejudice, then, may simply be that what the
courts and legislatures viewed as a safety valve--the opportunity to challenge a
conviction where a defense attorney's performance was constitutionally
inadequate--was quickly overrun. The dynamics underlying this change, in
particular, the rise in indigency in the criminal justice system and the often
inadequate resources given to public defenders and appointed counsel, are
largely beyond the scope of this Essay. 152 The next Part, however, explores the
various reasons why courts made ineffective assistance of counsel claims exempt
from the procedural restrictions to which other potential habeas claims are
subject.
IV.

EXPLAINING THE POPULARITY OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

As the analysis in the previous section indicated, ineffective assistance of
counsel allegations now dominate habeas corpus litigation-a development
several decades in the making-primarily because ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are not subject to the strictest procedural forfeiture rules. 153 Why
the exception? Part of the answer may be simply practical. Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims often require additional fact finding in the form of
either testimony from the prisoner's former counsel about the basis for various
decisions, or investigations into the merits of substantive defenses or procedural
deficiencies that defense counsel chose not to explore at trial. 154 As mentioned
earlier, the logical forum for such fact finding to take place is in post-conviction
proceedings rather than on direct appeal, which provides at least some reason for
exempting ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the normal procedural

152. Professor William Stuntz devoted much of his career to analyzing the various ways in
which the expansion of criminal procedure rights led to a political backlash that deprived indigent
defendants of the resources necessary to contest criminal charges and thus, ironically, probably
resulted in more poor defendants being sentenced to lengthy prison terms. See, e.g., William J.
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1969 (2008) (discussing the inequalities in the
American criminal justice system and possible steps for reversing them); William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedureand Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997)
(discussing the harshness of criminal procedure).
153. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984)). In Harrington,the Court explained that:
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and
forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be
applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' threaten the integrity of the
very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
Id.
154. See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) ("The court may take
testimony from the witnesses for the defendant and the prosecution and from the counsel alleged to
have rendered the deficient performance.").
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default rules. 155 Other claims, however, such as a prosecutor's failure to turn
over Brady material, also frequently require post-conviction fact finding, and so
this practical point is likely only part of the story. I suggest that the answer
stems from a combination of three different factors.
A.

It Is a Byproduct of Cause and Prejudice

The first explanation is purely practical: Ineffective assistance of counsel is a
claim that is seemingly specifically tailored to the cause and prejudice test. If a
prisoner must present a claim to the trial court in the first instance or otherwise
account for the failure, the most logical explanation for that failure is the defense
counsel's decision not to raise or explore the issue in the original proceeding.
1 56
The Supreme Court made clear in Murray v. Carrier,
however, that counsel's
failure to raise an issue would not constitute cause for purposes of the cause and
prejudice test unless the error was so egregious as to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 57 Therefore, any legal issues that are not adjudicated on
the merits at trial-which are the claims most likely to result in a successful
habeas petition-had to be presented as an ineffective assistance of counsel
issue. 158 This result is one that many people predicted when the cause and
prejudice test was adopted. 159
Of course, allowing prisoners to present other substantive issues through the
vehicle of an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge probably distorted the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel that the Supreme Court thought it was
developing in Strickland. A lawyer's performance, at least under the Strickland
test, is supposed to be evaluated based on the entirety of the record and with due
deference to the notion that some omissions may have been strategic. 1" But
ineffective assistance of counsel case law is replete with examples, some from
the Supreme Court itself, that hold that a single act or omission is serious enough

155. See id. at 504-05; United States v. Moreland, 604 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Garcia,
567 F.3d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir.
2008)).
156. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
157. See id. at 496 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.20 (1984)).
158. See id.

159. See supra text accompanying note 63.
160. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("In any case presenting an
ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances."). Of course, the Court has acknowledged that an isolated error
may form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but such cases were meant to be
the exception. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,791 (2011) ("And while in some instances
,even an isolated error' can support an ineffective-assistance claim if it is 'sufficiently egregious
and prejudicial,' it is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel's overall performance
indicates active and capable advocacy." (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496)).
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to constitute ineffective assistance, while simultaneously161finding that the error
was so basic that it could not possibly have been strategic.

There are two salient points here. First, as the previous section
demonstrated, ineffective assistance of counsel should be thought of not
primarily as a constitutional claim in its own right, but rather as a way of making
other constitutional or procedural claims in a habeas corpus petition. Davis v.
Secretary for the Department of Corrections is just one example of how an

independent criminal procedure claim is incorporated into an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. 162 The inquiry usually proceeds in three stages.
First, is there merit to the underlying claim? 163 Second, is it likely that the
outcome of the trial or sentencing would have been different had counsel
presented the claim? 164 Third, is there a good reason why counsel did not pursue
the claim during trial or sentencing? 65 When a court can answer yes to the first
two questions and no to the third, it is very likely to entertain the habeas
petition, 66 even if the Supreme Court has suggested that courts should be
reluctant to grant the writ based on an attorney's isolated errors.167
Second, the fact that the Court preserved the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel as a means to overcome procedural default rules is also, in itself,
evidence of the privileged place of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas
litigation. 168 The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Cronic,169 and in
Murray v. Carrier, that a single error, as opposed to a record of deficient

performance, could form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
if the error was sufficiently serious and prejudicial.' 17 Both statements were
arguably dicta-the Court reversed the lower court decision granting the writ in

161. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-84 (2005) (holding that defense
counsel's failure to examine petitioner's prior conviction file, in a capital case where those prior
convictions would be used to establish eligibility for the death penalty, constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel). Of course, given that these sorts of elementary mistakes often occur in
capital cases, one can hardly criticize the Court for finding that kind of performance deficient.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 137-145.
163. See, e.g., Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688) (stating that the petitioner must first show that attorney's actions did not meet the
standard of care, i.e., objectively reasonable performance).
164. See, e.g., id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (stating that the second inquiry is
whether petitioner can "show that there is a 'reasonable probability' that but for his counsel's error,
the outcome would have been different").
165. See, e.g., id. (finding no valid excuse for counsel's failure to raise a state law claim with
respect to a key trial witness).
166. See id. at 534.
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
168. See Voigts, supra note 7, at 1118 (stating that a claim for inefficient counsel is often a
precondition to raising additional claims that petitioners otherwise would not be able to raise due to
waiver or procedural default).
169. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
170. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
171. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n.20); Cronic, 466 U.S. at
657 n.20.
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both cases

-but

the Court seemingly felt compelled to leave ineffective

assistance of counsel in place as a safety valve for the otherwise rigid procedural
default rules despite its reluctance to actually grant the writ in the cases before it.
As such, this first explanation about the need to overcome procedural default

only tells part of the story. There are, after all, other ways of curing procedural3
bar,1
default in federal habeas corpus litigation, such as the actual innocence

but thus far, actual innocence claims have not overtaken habeas litigation in the
same way that ineffective assistance of counsel claims have.1 74

Ineffective

assistance of counsel claims predominate in part because they are necessary, but
also because petitioners have, in the past, perceived that courts are receptive to
them-something that the list of successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in Part I1.B demonstrates at least anecdotally. Thus, an explanation of
the rise of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas litigation should also
discuss the reasons why such claims might be particularly appealing to federal
courts.
B. The Long Shadow of Gideon v. Wainwright

The reason that ineffective assistance of counsel has become central to
federal habeas litigation is not just practical, but normative as well. The
normative case for this development is probably best accounted for as a
byproduct of the influence of Gideon v. Wainwright.1 75 Gideon is perhaps the

only defendant-friendly Warren Court criminal procedure decision that has not
led to a significant backlash. In fact, it continues to stand as a rather heroic
moment in the Court's history 176 and a centerpiece of its criminal procedure
the Court believes
jurisprudence. Indeed, it is to this day the only case that
177
Teague.
under
retroactivity
for
standard
the
would satisfy

Gideon, in turn, is a monument to lawyers' belief in their central place in the
criminal justice system. 78 The rule that the Court announced in Gideon, that all

172. Murray, 477 U.S. at 497; Cronic,466 U.S. at 666-67.
173. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 331 (1995) (discussing the application of rules
regarding actual innocence).
174. See HANsoN & DALEY, supra note 15, at 14 (reporting that ineffective assistance of
counsel consisted of 25% of the issues raised in habeas corpus petitions, while actual innocence is
not mentioned). It bears noting that the actual innocence exception probably presents a tougher
hurdle for habeas petitioners than the ineffective assistance of counsel exception. A petitioner
proceeding under the actual innocence exception must establish that, in light of new evidence, "it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The Court has emphasized that this exception requires
new and credible evidence, often of a scientific or technical nature, and that it is a remedy reserved
for "extraordinary" cases. Id. at 324, 327 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).
175. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
176. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
177. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007).
178. While Gideon overruled the special circumstances rule that the Supreme Court had
previously applied to cases in which a state court criminal defendant was denied the assistance of
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felony defendants are entitled to the right to counsel, 179 supplanted a much
fuzzier standard adopted in Betts v. Brady,18 which gave a defendant a right to
counsel only in cases where "the totality of facts" suggested that the defense
would benefit from professional counsel. 181 Prior to its repeal in Gideon,
criminal procedure scholars criticized Betts by demonstrating that the record
from nearly any trial would reveal crucial pieces of evidence or eyewitness
testimony that could have been excluded, demonstrated as irrelevant, or seriously
undermined by competent defense counsel. 182 At the very least, the public's
faith in the fairness of the ultimate outcome of the trial would be enhanced if the
prosecution was put to its full burden of proof by professional opposition. 183
Because criminal defendants were often poor and politically powerless, the
Court could not trust that state legislatures, responding to the normal demands of
the political process, would provide them with adequate representation without
some prompting on constitutional grounds. 184 The significance of Gideon as an
anti-poverty measure "could not be missed,"' 85 and the case was a paradigmatic
' 86
example of the simple, representation-reinforcing criminal procedure right.
The Court's opinion in Strickland went through great pains to demonstrate
that
it wasexplained:
consistent with, and actually furthered, the holding of Gideon.187 As
the Court
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside
the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance
of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to

counsel, it was in line with a number of previous decisions finding that the Sixth Amendment
entitled a defendant to the assistance of counsel in certain state cases, particularly capital cases, and
in federal criminal cases. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. VI) (holding that the Sixth Amendment required the right to counsel in noncapital
federal criminal prosecutions); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("[A defendant] requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.").
179. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
180. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
181. See id. at 462. In another portion of the Betts opinion, the Court held that indigent
defendants are entitled to counsel only if the denial of counsel would result in a "trial ...offensive
to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." Id. at 473.
182. See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 20 U. CRi. L. REv. 1, 42-56 (1962) (discussing the trial
record in Betts v. Brady).
183. See id. at 53-56 (suggesting that assistance of counsel during trial is invaluable in
holding the prosecution to its full burden of proof).
184. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
185. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom (Review Essay of Eric
Foner, The Story of American Freedom (1998)), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 272 (2000).
186. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124-25 (1980)
187. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984).
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the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused
is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed,
who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. 188
At the risk of belaboring a fairly obvious point, the Court needed to set some
kind of floor for attorney performance in criminal defense cases because it
recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel." 189
Gideon and Argersinger v. Hamlin,19 0 a later right to counsel case, set off

calls for further reforms to the system with respect to appointing counsel in
criminal cases, as the right to counsel is meaningless if the supposed counsel was
merely "a warm body with a legal pedigree."'' l The federal courts of appeals
responded to Gideon and similar cases by revising their own pre-Strickland
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel. Throughout the 1960s, the
relevant test was whether counsel had so thoroughly bungled the case as to make
the proceedings "a farce, or a mockery of justice, or. . . shocking to the
conscience of the reviewing court."192 In the 1970s, however, the circuit courts
gradually adopted a requirement of "customary" attorney performance or
"reasonably effective assistance," which may or may not have been coupled with
a requirement that the habeas petitioner demonstrate prejudice from the
attorney's deficient performance. 193 These new Sixth Amendment standards

188. Id. at 685. For criticism of Strickland as a cover for state efforts to vitiate the right to
counsel, see Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1259 (1986).
189. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
191. David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 818-19
(1976). See also NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 43, 46
(1973).
192. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965) (citations omitted) (citing eleven
Circuit Court cases in support of the enunciated rule). The test from Beto was cited by a number of
federal circuit courts in their own habeas decisions. See Bazelon, supra note 191, at 819 n.39.
193. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975)
(holding that an attorney must meet "a minimum standard of professional representation"); Beasley
v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that an attorney must "render[]
reasonably effective assistance"); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
the "reasonably effective assistance" standard applies to attorneys); United States v. DeCoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1202, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968))
(stating that an attorney must provide "reasonably competent assistance," and that the burden is on
the government to show a lack of prejudice); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir.
1970) (holding that an attorney must conform to the "customary skill and knowledge that normally
prevails at the time and place"); Coles, 389 F.2d at 226 (setting forth a list of requirements for
effective performance). Three federal circuits continued to use the farce or mockery of justice
standard. See Bazelon, supra note 191, at 820 n.47 (citing United States v. Reyes, No. 73-1595
(10th Cir., Dec. 10, 1975); United States v. Stern, 519 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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certainly did not satisfy broader calls for reform, 94 but they established at least
some nominal level of federal court oversight for the indigent defense system,
albeit indirect oversight through the vehicle of habeas litigation.
Courts were thus careful to preserve ineffective assistance of counsel as a
safety valve for otherwise defaulted habeas claims because it allowed federal
195
courts to monitor compliance with one of the "bedrock procedural elements"'
of constitutional criminal procedure. By scrutinizing the performance of defense
counsel in state criminal trials, and by giving themselves the freedom to review
otherwise unreviewable claims when counsel's error appeared sufficiently
egregious, federal courts could, at least theoretically, ensure the vitality of the
adversarial criminal process.196 Of course, plenty of empirical evidence suggests
that nothing like that actually took place. Instead, decades of budget cuts for
public defenders and appointed counsel have largely deprived indigent
defendants of any sort of effective representation. 197 But the issue here is
doctrinal, and is more about what courts believe that they have accomplished as
opposed to what they have actually accomplished. It thus makes perfect sense
that in habeas litigation, which exists to review criminal convictions in violation
of the Constitution, federal courts would be especially vigilant about defending
one of their central criminal procedure precedents and particularly vigilant
because, as lawyers themselves, that precedent reaffirms their profession's
centrality in criminal procedure.
C.

Counsel's Role in the Corrective Process

A final explanation, which closely tracks the previous one, is that permitting
a broad range of habeas claims because of ineffective assistance of counsel
serves as a middle ground between those proposing broad access to federal
courts to litigate constitutional issues in state court convictions and those
proposing a much narrower remedy in the interest of promoting finality. As
mentioned briefly in Part II, there is an ongoing debate about the basic purpose

194. See Bazelon, supra note 191, at 821-23 (discussing why courts had not gone further in
defining ineffective assistance).
195. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
196. See Voigts, supra note 7, at 1121, 1124 (citing Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor:
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1862
(1994)) (stating that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that courts may review ineffective assistance of counsel claims even when there
are no properly preserved constitutional claims).
197. See AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR

EQUAL JUSTICE pt. 2, at 7 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal-aid-indigent -defendants/ls-sclaid-def-bp-right-tocounsel-in-criminal-proc
eedings.authcheckdam.pdf; Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045-53 (2006) (discussing how underfunding
for public defenders in many states has led to the deprivation of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to effective counsel).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss2/7

28

Zimpleman: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era

2011]

THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ERA

of the federal habeas remedy; specifically, whether it was meant to provide a

federal forum for litigating constitutional claims, even when those claims were
resolved by the state court, or whether it was intended to be a remedy solely for
prisoners convicted by state courts that lacked jurisdiction or adequate corrective
processes.' 98 Courts could split the difference, at least in part, by enforcing strict
procedural default rules, while creating an exception for claims that are so
obvious that the failure to raise them in state court demonstrates the
incompetence of defense counsel. Because the right to counsel has traditionally

been based on concerns that an innocent defendant could be railroaded without
professional assistance, habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
can serve as a proxy for defects in the corrective process and, in some cases, for
claims of actual innocence.' 99 Proponents of broad federal court review would no
doubt prefer an expansive scope of review, but given the political and judicial
pressure surrounding habeas corpus, these proponents probably cannot expect
much more than the current habeas system provides.
This combination of practical and normative concerns explains the current
state of the doctrine, which has established ineffective assistance of counsel as a
safety valve for procedural default rules that would otherwise doom a habeas
petition, and in turn, explains the predominance of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in federal habeas litigation. However, there is a substantial
disconnect between doctrine and reality here because habeas litigation is
expensive, time consuming for the federal courts, and exceedingly unlikely to
result in a successful petition. 200 The best efforts of judges and legislators have

198. For the former view, see, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus
Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 610, 618-20 (1982) (arguing, based on the legislative
history of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that Congress intended to provide state prisoners with the ability to
relitigate constitutional claims in federal court); Steiker, supra note 11, at 377 (proposing that
federal courts review freestanding claims of innocence). For the latter view, see Bator, supra note
11, at 454-62 (proposing to limit habeas relief to cases where the state court lacked jurisdiction or
the state failed to supply an adequate corrective process).
199. The relationship between assistance of counsel and corrective process, and actual
innocence is tenuous, however. Bator suggested at points in his article that he would not necessarily
support granting the writ even in cases where a petitioner was not provided with legal counsel, if the
record indicated that the state court was correct about the need for legal representation-following
the old Betts v. Brady special circumstances rule. See Bator, supra note 11, at 459 n.30. At other
points, however, Bator's article indicates that if a petitioner lacked counsel, a federal court could not
separate the adequacy of the corrective process from the merits of certain constitutional questions.
See id. at 949 n.142. Similarly, ineffective assistance of counsel claims will often center on errors
that do not really shake our faith in the petitioner's guilt-Kimmelman itself is probably the best
example of such a case. See supra note 83. However, because errors that implicate an attorney's
competence have a way of casting doubt on the adequacy of the adversarial process below, it would
be difficult to separate ineffective assistance of counsel claims that reflect on guilt or innocence
from ineffective assistance of counsel claims that do not implicate the petitioner's guilt or
innocence. The best that courts are likely able to do is to implement an over-inclusive rule that
permits Kimmelman-type claims.
200. About 17,000 habeas petitions are filed annually in federal courts, and only about fourtenths of 1% are successful. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too
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done very little to reduce the number of habeas petitions filed in federal court, as
prisoners seem to be recasting other constitutional claims as ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. 20' Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel-which
conceivably may have been an exception acceptable even to critics of habeas
litigation-has instead become another form of habeas relief for courts to narrow
through a variety of jurisprudential tools. The next section discusses that
change, which is currently taking place.
V. ENDING THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ERA
AEDPA created a number of new and significant hurdles for habeas
petitioners 202 that have reduced a petitioner's chances of success in court, 203 even
if AEDPA has not done much to deter filing petitions in the first place. 204
AEDPA and its attendant deferential standards of review for state court decisions
have also given the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals occasion to
issue a number of high profile opinions in habeas cases alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel-most issued within the last seven to eight years-that are
decidedly unreceptive to such claims and seem designed to stem the tide of
petitions presenting the claim in federal court. 205 This section focuses on two
doctrinal points, both of which are emphasized throughout the case law. The
first point emphasizes that § 2254(d)(1) allows federal courts to award habeas
relief only where the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States, 20 6 while the second point restricts the
meaning of "clearly established federal law" by cabining the reach of that phrase
only to the holdings of Supreme Court cases, leaving state courts free to apply,
or not apply, the Court's dicta as they see fit. In other words, these two points
involve judicial gloss upon the meaning of the phrases "contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of," and "clearly established federal law."

Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8. See also KING ET AL., supra note 96, at 58 (preAEDPA grant rate was about one per 100 filings; post-AEDPA grant rate was about one in 284
filings).
201. See Kevin J. O'Brien, Federal Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims: A
Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 183, 194 (1986) (stating that, for
example, "a person who is convicted after his attorney neglected to raise a fourth amendment claim
at trial will be likely to cast his habeas petition as a Sixth Amendment issue").
202. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
203. See supra note 200.
204. See SCALIA, supra note 22, at 17.
205. See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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A. A Broad View of "Reasonable Applications" of Clearly Established
FederalLaw

Criminal cases rarely present completely identical factual situations, and for
that reason, courts rarely find a precedential case directly on point. This is
particularly true when a court applies the Strickland standard, which boils down

to reasonable attorney performance, a case-by-case question, and prejudice, also
a case-by-case question.20 7

Under AEDPA, state courts have some freedom

when applying federal case law; if there is any doubt how precedent applies, the
state court can get the answer wrong, provided that its wrong answer is
nevertheless reasonable. 2° 8 And while the term "unreasonable" is "difficult to
of those difficult-to-define terms that judges are consistently
define," it is one
2 9
0
apply.
to
asked

In practice, a state court's freedom to offer any "reasonable" interpretation
of federal precedent means that precedent will most likely not apply in a novel
factual situation. For instance, in United States v. Cronic,21 0 the Supreme Court

explained that a defendant who is "denied the presence of counsel at a critical
stage of the prosecution" has likely been so prejudiced by that denial that "the

cost of litigating [its] effect in a particular case is unjustified.,

211

However, a

state court is free to determine that a defendant whose counsel appears via

speakerphone at a plea hearing (defense counsel who literally phones it in) has
not been denied the presence of counsel at the hearing.21 2 Even if the Supreme
Court, in Cronic, meant, by using the phrase "presence of counsel" to call for

counsel to be physically in the courtroom at the critical stages,
21 3 the state is given
the benefit of the doubt in the face of the drafting ambiguity.

In the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims specifically, the
Court has instructed lower courts that Strickland and AEDPA establish a
24
"doubly
deferential"when
standard
of review.
1 That is, courts in general should be
highly deferential
evaluating
an attorney's
performance under Strickland,

207. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ("[E]valuating whether a rule
application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule,
the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.").
208. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ("For purposes of today's opinion, the
most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrectapplication of federal law.").
209. See id.
210. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
211. See id. at 658, 662.
212. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 121, 126 (2008) (per curiam).
213. See id. at 126-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
214. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) ("Under the
doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the
§ 2254(d)(1) standard, [the petitioner's] ineffective-assistance claim fails.") (internal citation
omitted).
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indulging the presumption that a defense attorney is strategically choosing to
explore certain defenses and forego others. 215 Additionally, a federal court
should be equally deferential to the state court's determination with respect to
the attorney's performance. 216 Therefore, the state court's decision to deny
collateral relief on the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel allegation
should be reversed by a federal court only when the state court made an
unreasonable determination about the unreasonable conduct of defense
counsel. 217 Further, the way in which the Supreme Court has framed the
applicable standard of review could be described as "triply deferential," as courts
have more freedom when applying general rules that result in case-by-case
determinations, such as the Strickland standard, than in applying specific rules
that dictate certain outcomes.21 8
B. A Narrow View of "Clearly Established" FederalLaw

Just as state courts are given some leeway in how they apply federal law,
they are also given the benefit of the doubt as to just what constitutes federal
law. AEDPA specifically limited the relevant body of law to "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' 19 Therefore, state courts are not obliged to follow their local federal

court of appeals on220questions with a, circuit split. The Supreme Court, in
Williams v. Taylor, further limited "clearly established federal law" to the
holdings of Supreme Court cases, such that dicta, no matter how carefully
221
considered, are not binding on state courts in the context of AEDPA. 2 1

This rule regarding dicta is a departure from the normal rule because lower
courts are generally obliged to respect the dicta in Supreme Court decisions as
well as the specific holding, provided that the dicta are carefully considered.222
The rule is also ironic given that the statement in the Williams opinion was,

215. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5-6.
216. See id. at 5 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 2425 (2002) (per curiam); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000)).
217. See id. (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21; Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24-25; Williams, 529
U.S. at 409).
218. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
220. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
221. See id. at 412 ("'[C]learly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States' . . . refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision." (quoting § 2254(d)(1))).
222. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 216 F.3d 1180,
1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (court finding itself "bound" to the Supreme Court's legal interpretation,
even though given in dicta, because "carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if
technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative" (quoting United States v. Oakar, 11
F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
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arguably, itself part of the dicta.223 Nevertheless, the Court's gloss on clearly
established federal law appeared in a series of post-AEDPA cases where the
Court rejected habeas petitions after determining that the relevant principle of
federal law that the petitioner relied upon was merely non-binding dicta. 24 The
federal courts of appeals have taken the hint and have rejected habeas petitions
where the relevant provision of federal law was not spelled out in the holding of
225
the case.

Taken together, these two limitations on the availability of habeas relief
indicate that if ineffective assistance of counsel was the ideal claim for the era of
cause and prejudice, a safety valve in case of larger breakdowns in corrective
processes, it is something else entirely in the era of AEDPA. Indeed, despite a
few successful petitions in capital cases, often limited only to the capital
sentencing portion of the state proceeding, 226 the Supreme Court has been

distinctly unreceptive to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the last few

years. 227 The Court now cautions lower courts regarding the "substantial judicial

223. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 78 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Nevertheless, in a
somewhat ironic dictum in her Williams opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the statutory phrase
'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' refers to
'the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision."' (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412)). Of course, because federal courts are
obliged to respect carefully considered dicta like the gloss on "clearly established Federal law" from
Williams, this establishes a "dicta for federal courts, no dicta for state courts" dichotomy in habeas
review. Compare Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Oakar, 111 F.3d at
153) (recognizing that federal courts are bound by dicta of the Supreme Court, rather than just
holdings), with Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (explaining that state courts should rely only on the
Supreme Court holdings, and not dicta).
224. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (citing § 2254(d)(1)); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 660-62, 666, 669 (2004) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
71-72 (2003) (citing § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 664-66
(2001) (citing § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412).
225. See, e.g., Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 975, 977-78, 980 (1lth Cir. 2011) (citing
Williams, 529 U.S. 412) (rejecting petitioner's habeas claim because it found no clear Supreme
Court precedent); Likely v. Ruane, 642 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Wright v. Van Patten,
552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (per curiam); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412)) (rejecting petitioner's habeas
claim because there was no clear Supreme Court holding that the admission of certain evidence
violated the Confrontation Clause); Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 569-70, 586 (6th Cir. 2010)
(reversing the lower court because it relied partially on dicta from a Supreme Court case in support
for granting petitioner's habeas claim).
226. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that
petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where counsel failed to introduce
strong mitigating evidence); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-86 (2005) (holding that counsel
was deficient for failing to make reasonable investigations of petitioner's prior convictions in order
to assist in mitigation); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514, 523-25 (2003) (holding that petitioner
received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to make certain reasonable
discoveries and did not act properly with respect to known discoveries in the sentencing stage of
petitioner's trial); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91 (holding counsel was ineffective because counsel
"failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury").
227. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403-04 (2011) (rejecting habeas
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 746 (2011)
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resources" that habeas litigation consumes and the concordant need for caution
when issuing the writ of habeas corpus. 228 This was a predictable reaction to the
fact that ineffective assistance of counsel began to swallow other claims in
habeas litigation. Faced with the prospect of a safety valve becoming a shortcut,
and given the political and federalism concerns implicated by habeas litigation,
the Court was at pains to demonstrate to petitioners that this was not the case.229
One case from the October 2010 term, Padilla v. Kentucky,23 ° serves as a
counterpoint to this last point, insofar as it held that defense counsel could be
constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise a defendant on the collateral
consequences of conviction, i.e., the effect of a guilty plea on a defendant's
immigration status. 231 That expansion of the Strickland rule is important, insofar
as it departs from the more recent trend in the Supreme Court's ineffective
assistance of counsel case law. But whether Padilla will have much of an effect
on habeas litigation has yet to be determined. The courts are currently split on
whether the Padilla opinion announced a rule that should apply retroactively in
habeas proceedings,
a question that will obviously bear on how much
additional litigation the opinion will cause. At any rate, the rule in Padilla
applies with full force only where the immigration consequences of a guilty plea
are obvious. Where "the law is not succinct and straightforward," an attorney
has a more limited obligation and "need do no more than advise a noncitizen
client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences. ,,233 This limitation, in concert with ambiguity over whether
Padillawill apply to any collateral consequences other than immigration issues,
and the fact that prisoners who plead guilty file habeas petitions at a much lower
rate than prisoners convicted after trial, 234 suggests that Padillawill not open the
floodgates of habeas litigation and was not a reversal from the Court's recent
ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.

(same); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (same); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.
Ct. 2250, 2264-65 (2010) (same); Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 687 (2010) (citing § 2254(d)(1);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)) (same); Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383,
386 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 834, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2008)) (same).
228. See Harrington,131 S. Ct. at 780.
229. See id.
230. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
231. Id. at 1483 (holding that defense counsel must have a basic understanding of immigration
law to competently represent clients who face deportation or other immigration consequences in
criminal cases).
232. Compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cit. 2011) (holding that Padilla
applies retroactively on habeas review), and United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL
2650625, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (same), with Ellis v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 4017
(BMC), 2011 WL 3664658, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011) (holding that Padilla does not apply
retroactively), Mathur v. United States, Nos. 7:07-CR-92-BO, 7:1 I-CV-67-BO, 2011 WL 2036701,
at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2011) (same), Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (E.D.
Va. 2011) (same), and Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (E.D. Va. 2011) (same).
233. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
234. See id. at 1485 & n.14 (citing FLANGO, supra note 18, at 36-38).
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Indeed, one case scheduled for the Supreme Court's October 2011 term
seems likely to continue the current trend. The question presented in Martinez v.
Ryan is whether a criminal defendant, who is prevented by a state statute from
raising the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel on direct appeal, has a
constitutional
to 235
the effective assistance of counsel in his first state post.. right,.
conviction proceeding.
The Supreme Court has never held that a prisoner has
the right to counsel in a collateral proceeding,236 so the case presents the
additional issue of whether a prisoner has any kind of Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, let alone the effective assistance of counsel, in a collateral proceeding.
Martinez v. Ryan demonstrates a dynamic between criminal procedure rights
and resources that can only be described as "Stuntzian. 237 That is, underlying
the case is an instance in which a state controls the relief available for a federal
constitutional claim by controlling the circumstances under which the claim can
238
In Arizona, prisoners
be made, and the resources available in presenting it.
are not allowed to raise claims about the effectiveness of their trial counsel on
direct appeal; however, prisoners are permitted to raise those claims in their first
petition for post-conviction relief, where they may or may not be represented by
counsel. 239 A petitioner may or may not have the resources to investigate the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim-a pro se petitioner almost certainly
would not. The petitioner in Martinez was represented by counsel in the first
post-conviction proceeding, but counsel later filed a statement attesting that she
saw no tenable grounds for post-conviction relief. 24° Under the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the petitioner could have filed his own pro se petition for
post-conviction relief, but he alleged that his lawyer failed to inform him that he
had such a right. 241 In a second post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner,
represented this time by different counsel, raised a number of claims about the
effectiveness of trial counsel, which the Arizona state court rejected because the
petitioner failed to raise them in the initial post-conviction petition. 242 Turning

235. Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 2960
(2011); see also Martinez v. Ryan, SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
martinez-v-ryan (last visited Dec. 14, 2011).
236. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("We have never held that
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions ....).
237. The term "Stuntzian" refers to William Stuntz, whose work described the often
frustrating ways that criminal procedure rights play out in the criminal justice system, where
legislatures frequently respond to the expansion of criminal procedure rights by giving indigent
defendants fewer and fewer opportunities to raise claims regarding those rights. See Michael
Klarman, David Skeel, & Carol Steiker, Introduction: Appreciating Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 6-7

(2012),

available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1899957.
238. See id.
239. See ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a).
240. Martinez, 623 F.3d at 734.
241. See id.
242. Id.
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to the federal courts, the petitioner argued that the ineffectiveness of his counsel
in the first post-conviction proceeding was sufficient cause to excuse his
procedural default, a claim that the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected, reasoning that a prisoner has no right to counsel in a
post-conviction proceeding. 243 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 6,

2011.244
Predicting the outcome of Supreme Court cases is always tricky, and
because AEDPA requires federal courts to be even more deferential than they
otherwise would be, it is especially difficult to predict the outcome of habeas
cases. That said, Martinez v. Ryan is probably not an ideal vehicle for
proponents of the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. If the
Supreme Court were to rule for Martinez, it would open a second front for
review of otherwise defaulted claims, and the Court has been at pains to limit the
availability of review for defaulted claims, even in the first collateral proceeding.
The ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel could excuse a prisoner's failure
to present claims about the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, and the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel would then excuse the prisoner's failure to
present otherwise defaulted constitutional claims. In other words, state and
federal courts would have to review the performance of counsel at two different
levels before going on to assess the impact of an issue that never came up at trial
in the first place. And again, while it is difficult to predict these sorts of cases,
that seems to be an unlikely outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this Essay was simply to describe a particular
phenomenon in habeas litigation, the fact that ineffective assistance of counsel
has eclipsed most other issues presented in habeas petitions, and then to offer an
explanation as to how that happened, along with a description of what the
judicial and legislative response has been. Any further prescriptions for reform,
both in terms of reducing the volume of habeas litigation and clearing the
procedural thicket that meritorious claims must overcome, are beyond this
Essay's present purposes. However, it is worth asking, given the resources spent
on habeas petitions in both federal and state courts, what the future of this
litigation will look like in an era where there no longer appears to be any safety
valves for procedural default.
The answer, and it is admittedly a pessimistic one, is that not much will
really change. Despite decades of procedural reform, prisoners continue to file
habeas petitions at a fairly consistent rate. Like all litigants, habeas petitions will

243. See id. at 735-36, 739-40 ("We conclude that there is no federal constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel in connection with state collateral relief proceedings, even where those
proceedings constitute the first tier of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.").
244. Martinez v. Ryan, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (2011).
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respond to cues from the courts. When told that they will forfeit any claim that
was not properly presented in the original proceeding, they will look for some
way to cure the default; and, when told that one particular claim is a good way to
cure a previous default, they will raise that claim.245 If a petition presenting
those claims is less likely to succeed right now, so be it. A habeas petition never

had much chance of success anyway. Reformers on both sides should be
unhappy with the current state of affairs-no decrease in the volume of cases,
yet more impediments for the meritorious ones. Then it is, indeed, worth
considering whether the time has come for more serious reforms, ones that go
tinkering with procedural rules, doctrine, and standards of
beyond 24simply
6
review.

245. This remark is not meant to dismiss concerns about the adequacy of representation for
indigent defendants in the United States, which are legitimate concerns. See supra note 197 and
accompanying text. What I mean is simply that independent of the merits of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, habeas corpus doctrine encouraged petitioners to present those claims. That this
occurred during a time when indigent defense systems became more and more overburdened is
ironic, and perhaps suggests courts may not be the most effective guardians of Sixth Amendment
rights.
246. See Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2526-27 (proposing that resources for federal habeas
litigation could be redirected to criminal defense systems).
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